Banco Central do Egito elevará taxa de juros na libra Em sua última reunião de quinta-feira, o Comitê de Política Monetária (MPC) do Banco Central do Egito decidiu elevar a taxa de depósito overnight em 50 pontos base para 9,25%, e 10,25%, respectivamente. Isso marca o primeiro aumento sob o novo governador do CBE, Tarek Amer, e o último deste ano. O CBE indicou em comunicado que havia concordado com o governo durante as últimas semanas na Reunião de Coordenação para elaborar um plano de estabilidade microeconômica que contribuísse positivamente para o crescimento econômico, aumento da produção local e criação de empregos. O plano será revisado durante a reunião especial dos Conselhos de Coordenação, marcada para 10 de janeiro de 2016. Em um contexto relacionado, o MPC do Sistema de Reserva Federal Americano decidiu pela primeira vez desde 11 anos que aumentará a taxa básica de juros em um quarto. de um ponto percentual, saltando assim para uma estimativa entre 0,25% e 0,50%. A decisão encerra uma controvérsia prolongada sobre a capacidade da maior economia do mundo de suportar um possível aumento dos custos de empréstimos. A Arábia Saudita, o Kuwait, o Bahrein e os Emirados Árabes Unidos foram todos motivados pelo movimento norte-americano, ao tomarem medidas semelhantes aumentando a taxa de juros em 0,25 ponto percentual. Nady Azzam, analista financeiro, apontou em pronunciamentos anteriores ao site de notícias da Al-Arabia que a elevação das taxas de juros pelo CBE egípcio levará a um aumento nos níveis de liquidez no mercado local, aumentando assim a capacidade do governo de financiar os gastos públicos. No entanto, ele descartou a possibilidade de haver uma conexão com as decisões de elevar as taxas de juros tomadas tanto pela CBE egípcia quanto por sua contraparte americana. Uma pesquisa realizada pela Pharos Holding Corporate para Pesquisa mostrou que a liquidez subiu para o nível mais alto de sua história devido às medidas de monetização do déficit implementadas pela CBE. A liquidez armazenada na CBEs se aproximou de L. E 159,6 bilhões até o final de setembro, alcançando o nível mais alto registrado em julho de 2008, que foi de US $ 193,5 bilhões. A Azzam esperava um aumento geral nos níveis de liquidez após o aumento das taxas de juros nos certificados de depósito. O aumento da liquidez, ele garantiu, aumentará a capacidade das CBEs de enfrentar o mercado negro e, assim, fornecer a liquidez necessária para financiar os gastos públicos. A Azzam previu potenciais efeitos negativos da decisão dos CBEs sobre as taxas de juros. Estes podem incluir recessão crescente e taxas de inflação excepcionalmente altas. Por sua vez, os dois últimos terão efeito sobre o aumento do custo de empréstimos, particularmente à luz da dependência do governo dos empréstimos para financiar o déficit orçamentário, que agirá incansavelmente sobre o orçamento geral estadual após o aumento das taxas dos serviços da dívida pública. bem como estabilizar a queda do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB). No entanto, Azzam insistiu que esses efeitos seriam limitados enquanto o governo persistir em regular os preços e monitorar os mercados de varejo. Vale ressaltar que a CBE decidiu na quinta-feira passada manter sua tão esperada decisão sobre as taxas de juros até ontem, deixando espaço para mais deliberações com o governo sobre a inflação e o crescimento. Também formou um grupo de trabalho coordenador, incluindo representantes do CBE, dos ministérios das Finanças, Indústria e Comércio Exterior e Investimento, com o propósito de desenvolver uma sugestão de plano de trabalho para coordenar as políticas fiscal e monetária. A sugestão será revista durante a segunda reunião do Conselho de Coordenação de Política Monetária início de janeiro. Fraude de investimento onde os funcionários são condenados a estuprar clientes fora de seu dinheiro Milhares de britânicos, incluindo muitos aposentados perderam milhões de libras em uma fraude secreta conhecida como binário investimentos em opções. A polícia britânica recebe uma média de dois relatórios de fraude por dia e as vítimas perderam até 200.000. Insiders em um call center atrás do golpe revelaram que os funcionários foram obrigados a estuprar clientes de seu dinheiro. E alguns corretores envolvidos trocaram histórias de pessoas que cometeram suicídio depois de perceberem que foram enganadas. As empresas atraem as vítimas por e-mails fraudulentos, com vendedores de alta pressão persuadindo os profissionais a investirem pequenas somas como 250. Uma segunda equipe, em seguida, apóia-se nesses investidores para investir. (História completa) Navegação Isso me lembra. Eu preciso assistir Wolf of Wall Street novamente Ambas as empresas não são regulamentadas, eu trabalhei com AA e eles eram terríveis, agora estou trabalhando com uma empresa regulada e estou fazendo lucros e é uma experiência totalmente diferente, eu me sinto um pouco boba por não fazendo minha pesquisa pela primeira vez e escolhendo a empresa correta. Puxa, isso é algo novo. Qualquer corretor que lhe peça para depositar mais dinheiro, a fim de permitir que você faça o primeiro depósito em apenas um SCAM. Simples assim É apenas um atraso tácito e uma maneira de garantir que eles roubem mais dinheiro de você antes de perceber que você foi enganado. Cada golpe de loja de balde fez exatamente a mesma coisa em todos os outros tópicos que li nos últimos seis anos. Está escrito no manual de golpes de opções Forex e Binário na página três, quarto parágrafo abaixo. Tactic18.2, Ofereça-lhes um bônus de depósito de 200 se eles estão negociando há mais de seis meses, e 500 de depósito em que eles são novos para negociação e certifique-se de forçá-los ao comércio, por exemplo, 500-1000 lotes para receber bônus falso, Isso ajuda a garantir que o novo operador perca sua pequena conta dentro de seis meses. Tática18.3Ofereça-lhes ajuda para recuperar sua perda inicial de depósito, nomeando um gerente de conta com habilidades e talento de negociação superior, permite que você (o corretor) assuma o controle dos botões de compra e venda, (agora tem a capacidade de comprar e vender ilimitado risco e lotes máximos contra a tendência e no mercado, de modo a acabar com a conta dentro de alguns minutos / horas.) Assegure-se de que sua vítima assine este contrato, então quando ele começar a reclamar que você perdeu a conta, estará coberto. .4Se um novo operador tiver conseguido alcançar as condições exigidas de negociação e lucrar, e depois tiver a audácia de solicitar uma retirada parcial / total, ele estaria mentindo em seu aplicativo e teria conhecimento de negociação ou estava recebendo terceiros. ajudar a fazer lucros. As opções aqui são negar a retirada e enviar uma mensagem informando que a conta está sendo analisada. Essa revisão atrasará o processo por vários dias / semanas, o tempo será dinheiro e você não precisará gastar todo o seu tempo em um cliente quando houver fonte de renda fresca / clientes esperando por aí que acham que será o próximo Paulson. Tática18.5Fechar sua conta e ignorar seus pedidos mesquinhos de explicações, se você tiver que passá-los para outro (falso curso) departamento isso ajudará a atrasá-los até que eles perdem a esperança e, eventualmente, ir embora e parar de importuná-lo. Esta tática é bem sucedida em 97 dos casos, a vítima só aceita que eles foram enganados e não o incomodarão novamente. Os outros 3 clientes entrarão em contato com outros fóruns e reclamarão com várias agências desdentadas na esperança de que você retorne seus depósitos. Por sorte, você seguiu o livro de regras da página 1 onde estabeleceu negócios a partir de ilhas não regulamentadas com regras e regulamentos muito frouxos. . Tactic18.6Se o seu negócio é finalmente cai sob a má reputação na Internet fóruns de revisão que você pode ter que re-marca, felizmente isso é bastante fácil, um bom modelo de negócio é um bom modelo de negócio depois de tudo. Você pode perder semanas fey no re-branding e construir novas vítimas, mas você sabe quotthere é um nascido a cada minuto - como diz o ditado e você ainda terá clientes do antigo negócio que ainda se recusam a acreditar que eles são a vítima de uma empresa scam que algum outro cliente reclamou em algum forex forum. É difícil acreditar que algumas pessoas são ingênuas, mas é verdade e são esses os principais clientes que ajudarão a financiar seu estilo de vida. Como sempre, o assunto está aberto para revisão e atualização. os fatos desnudados 20 de março de 2012 "Asia Times" - Existe alguma verdade nas alegações de que círculos informados obtiveram lucros substanciais nos mercados financeiros em conexão com os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001, nos Estados Unidos? O melhor lugar para começar é examinar as opções de venda, que ocorreram por volta de terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 2001, em uma extensão anormal e no início via software que desempenhou um papel fundamental: o Sistema de Informações Gerenciais da Procuradoria, abreviado como PROMIS. O PROMIS é um programa de software que parece ser equipado com habilidades quase "categóricas". Além disso, é o tema de uma disputa de décadas entre seu inventor, Bill Hamilton, e várias pessoas / instituições associadas a agências de inteligência, firmas de consultoria militar e de segurança. 1 Uma das capacidades quotmagical do PROMIS, supõe-se, é que ele é equipado com inteligência artificial e foi, aparentemente, desde o início capaz de ler e integrar simultaneamente qualquer número de diferentes programas de computador ou bancos de dados, independentemente do idioma em que programas originais tinham sido escritos ou os sistemas operacionais e plataformas nos quais aquele banco de dados estava instalado atualmente. ”2 E então fica realmente interessante: O que você faria se possuísse um software que pudesse pensar, entender todas as principais linguagens do mundo, Forneceu peeps-hole em todos os computadores, que poderiam inserir dados em computadores sem o conhecimento das pessoas, que poderiam preencher espaços em branco além do raciocínio humano, e também prever o que as pessoas fazem - antes de fazê-lo Você provavelmente usaria, você não o faria? Concedido, esses recursos soam dificilmente críveis. Na verdade, toda a história do PROMIS, que Mike Ruppert desenvolve no decorrer de seu livro Crossing the Rubicon em todas as suas facetas e reviravoltas bizarras, parece que alguém desenvolveu um romance no estilo de Philip K Dick e William Gibson. No entanto, o que Ruppert coletou sobre o PROMIS é baseado em fontes confiáveis, bem como em resultados de investigações pessoais, que aguardam um júri para dar uma primeira olhada crítica. Isso parece ainda mais urgente se você acrescentar aos recursos do PROMIS que foi dado que o PROMIS foi usado para uma grande variedade de propósitos por agências de inteligência, incluindo o monitoramento em tempo real de transações de ações em todos os principais mercados financeiros do mundo. 4 Estamos, portanto, lidando com um software que: a) Infiltra sistemas de computadores e de comunicação sem ser notado. b) Pode manipular dados. c) É capaz de rastrear o mercado global de ações em tempo real. O ponto c é relevante para tudo o que aconteceu em conexão com as transações nunca completamente esclarecidas que ocorreram pouco antes de 11 de setembro, e das quais o ex-presidente do Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Weltke disse que "não poderia ter sido planejado e executado sem um certo conhecimento". . 6 Perguntei especificamente ao jornalista financeiro Max Keiser, que durante anos trabalhou na Wall Street como negociador de ações e opções, sobre os negócios de opções de venda. Keiser apontou nesse contexto que ele havia falado com muitos corretores nas torres do World Trade Center naquela época. Ouvi em primeira mão que a companhia aérea colocou o comércio de corretores na Cantor Fitzgerald dias antes. Ele então conversou comigo sobre uma questão explosiva, sobre a qual Ruppert elaborou detalhadamente Crossing the Rubicon. Max Keiser: Há muitos aspectos relativos a essas compras de opções que ainda não foram divulgadas. Eu também trabalhei na Alex Brown amp Sons (ABS). O Deutsche Bank comprou a Alex Brown amp Sons em 1999. Quando os ataques ocorreram, a ABS era de propriedade do Deutsche Bank. Uma pessoa importante no ABS era Buzzy Krongard. Eu o encontrei várias vezes nos escritórios em Baltimore. Krongard havia se transferido para se tornar diretor executivo da CIA. As compras de opções, nas quais a ABS estava envolvida, ocorreram nos escritórios da ABS em Baltimore. O barulho que ocorreu entre Baltimore, New York City e Langley foi interessante, como você pode imaginar, para dizer o mínimo. Sob consideração, aqui está o fato de que Alex Brown, uma subsidiária do Deutsche Bank (onde muitos dos supostos sequestradores do 11 de setembro lidaram com suas transações bancárias - por exemplo, Mohammed Atta) negociou compras de opções de compra na UAL da United Airlines através da Chicago Board Option. Exchange (CBOE) - pelo constrangimento dos investigadores -, como relatou o jornal britânico The Independent. 7 Em 12 de setembro, o presidente do conselho do Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, Mayo A Shattuck III, repentinamente e silenciosamente renunciou ao cargo, embora ainda tivesse um contrato de três anos com um salário anual de vários milhões de dólares norte-americanos. Pode-se perceber isso como algo estranho. Poucas semanas depois, o porta-voz da CIA na época, Tom Crispell, recusou todos os comentários, quando foi contatado por um relatório para o site de Rupperts, From the Wilderness, e estava sendo questionado se o Departamento do Tesouro ou o Departamento do Tesouro. O Bureau Federal de Investigações do FBI questionou o diretor executivo da CIA e ex-executivo-chefe do Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown, AB Buzzy Krongard, sobre o monitoramento dos mercados financeiros pela CIA usando PROMIS e sua antiga posição como superintendente das relações com clientes privados Browns. ele foi recrutado pessoalmente pelo ex-chefe da CIA, George Tenet, para a CIA, Krongard supervisionou principalmente clientes particulares em Alex Brown. 9 Em qualquer caso, após o 11 de setembro no primeiro dia de negociação, quando os mercados acionários dos EUA estavam novamente abertos, o preço das ações da UAL caiu 43. (As quatro aeronaves sequestradas em 11 de setembro foram o vôo 11 da American Airlines, American Airlines Flight 77 e vôos UAL 175 e 93.) Com sua experiência como ex-operador de opções, Keiser me explicou uma questão importante a esse respeito. Max Keiser: As opções de venda são, se forem empregadas em um mercado especulativo, basicamente apostam que os preços das ações cairão abruptamente. O comprador, que faz um contrato específico de tempo com um vendedor, não precisa possuir o estoque no momento em que o contrato é adquirido. Relacionado à questão do insider trading via opções de venda ou compra, há também uma notável definição dos economistas suíços Remo Crameri, Marc Chesney e Loriano Mancini, notadamente que um negócio de opção pode ser identificado como informado - mas ainda não é ) provado - quando é caracterizado por um grande incremento incomum de juros e volumes em aberto, induz a grandes ganhos e não é coberto pelo mercado de ações. 10 Juros abertos descrevem contratos que não foram liquidados (foram exercidos) até o final do pregão, mas ainda estão em aberto. Não coberto no mercado de ações significa que o comprador de uma opção (de venda ou de compra) não detém ações do ativo subjacente, pelo que ele poderia mitigar ou compensar perdas se o seu negócio não funcionar, ou formulado de forma diferente: não hedge, porque é desnecessário, já que se sabe que a aposta é uma, perdão, "assegure-se". (A esse respeito, portanto, não é realmente uma aposta, porque o resultado não é incerto, mas uma conclusão antecipada). Neste caso, o veículo do cálculo foi opções de venda a preço baixo que dão ao detentor o direito de vender certas ações a um preço que está muito abaixo do preço de mercado atual - o que é uma aposta altamente arriscada, porque você perde dinheiro se, no vencimento, o preço de mercado ainda for superior ao preço acordado na opção. No entanto, quando essas ações caíram muito mais profundamente após os ataques terroristas, essas opções multiplicaram seu valor várias centenas de vezes, porque agora o preço de venda especificado na opção era muito superior ao preço de mercado. Esses jogos arriscados com opções curtas são uma indicação segura para investidores que sabiam que em poucos dias aconteceria algo que reduziria drasticamente o preço de mercado dessas ações.11 O software, como o PROMIS, por sua vez, é usado com a intenção precisa de monitorar mercados de ações em tempo real para acompanhar movimentos de preços que parecem suspeitos. Portanto, os serviços de inteligência dos EUA devem ter recebido avisos claros das transações singulares, nunca antes vistas antes do 11 de setembro. De grande importância no que diz respeito à faixa, que deveria levar os perpetradores se você estivesse pensando seriamente em ir atrás deles, é isso: Max Keiser: A Corporação de Compensação de Opções tem o dever de lidar com as transações, e o faz anonimamente - enquanto o banco que executa a transação como corretor pode determinar a identidade de ambas as partes. Mas isso pode dificilmente ter sido a intenção das autoridades reguladoras quando a faixa levou, entre outros, a Buzzyquot Krongard, Alex Brown amp Sons e a CIA. Ruppert, no entanto, descreve este caso em Atravessando o Rubicão em toda a extensão possível. 12 Além disso, também existem maneiras e meios para que pessoas de dentro sigam seus rastros. Para ser menos óbvio, os insiders poderiam negociar um pequeno número de contratos. Estes poderiam ser negociados sob várias contas para evitar chamar a atenção para grandes volumes de negociação passando por uma única conta grande. Eles também poderiam negociar pequenos volumes em cada contrato, mas negociar mais contratos para evitar chamar a atenção. À medida que o interesse aberto aumenta, os não-insiders podem detectar um sinal percebido e aumentar sua atividade de negociação. Os insiders podem voltar a entrar em mais transações com base em um sinal comercial aparentemente significativo do mercado. A esse respeito, seria difícil para a CBOE desmascarar os insiders dos não-insiders, porque ambos estão negociando fortemente. ”13 O assunto que precisa ser esclarecido aqui é geralmente julgado por Keiser como segue: Max Keiser: Meu pensamento é que muitos (não todos) daqueles que morreram no 11 de setembro eram mercenários financeiros - e devemos sentir o mesmo sobre eles, como sentimos sobre todos os mercenários que são mortos. A tragédia é que essas empresas misturaram civis com mercenários e também foram mortas. Assim, as empresas de Wall Street usaram civis como escudos humanos. De acordo com um relatório da Bloomberg publicado no início de outubro de 2001, a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) iniciou uma investigação sobre certas transações do mercado de ações em 11 de setembro, incluindo 38 empresas, entre eles: American Airlines, United Airlines, Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp. American Express Corp. American International Group, AXA SA, Bank of America Corp. Banco de Nova York Corp. Bear Stearns, Citigroup , Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, General Motors e Raytheon. 14 Até agora tudo bem. No mesmo mês, no entanto, o jornal San Francisco Chronicle informou que a SEC tomou medidas sem precedentes para substituir centenas, senão mesmo milhares de interessados chaves no setor privado, em suas investigações. Em um comunicado que foi enviado a quase todas as empresas listadas nos EUA, a SEC solicitou às empresas endereçadas que designassem funcionários de alto escalão para a investigação, que ficariam cientes da natureza sensível do caso e poderiam confiar em “exercer a discrição apropriada”. 15 Em essência, tratava-se de controlar informações, não de fornecer e divulgar fatos. Tal curso de ação envolve conseqüências comprometedoras. Ruppert: O que acontece quando você substitui alguém em uma segurança nacional ou em uma investigação criminal é que você torna ilegal divulgar publicamente o que sabe. Jogada inteligente. Com efeito, eles se tornam agentes do governo e são controlados por regulamentações governamentais, e não por sua própria consciência. Na verdade, eles podem ser jogados na cadeia sem uma audiência, se falarem publicamente. Tenho visto essa ameaça implícita, vez após vez, com investigadores federais, agentes de inteligência e até mesmo membros do Congresso dos Estados Unidos que estão tão presos a juramentos de sigilo e acordos que nem sequer podem divulgar atividades criminosas dentro do governo por medo de encarceramento. . 16 Entre as reportagens sobre suspeitas de insider trading mencionadas em Crossing the Rubicon / From the Wilderness está uma lista que foi publicada sob o título “Terça-feira Negra: O Maior Scamquot de Informações Privilegiadas do Worlds International Institute for Counterterrorism” em 21 de setembro, 2001: Entre os dias 6 e 7 de setembro, a CBOE viu compras de 4.744 opções de compra na United Airlines, mas apenas 396 opções de compra. Assumindo que 4.000 das opções foram compradas por pessoas com conhecimento prévio dos ataques iminentes, estes “citados” teriam se beneficiado com quase 5 milhões. Em 10 de setembro, 4.516 opções de compra da American Airlines foram compradas na bolsa de Chicago, em comparação com apenas 748 chamadas. Mais uma vez, não havia notícias naquele momento para justificar novamente esse desequilíbrio, supondo que 4.000 dessas operações de opções representassem representantes, elas representariam um ganho de cerca de 4 milhões. Os níveis de opções de venda adquiridos acima foram mais de seis vezes superiores ao normal. Nenhum comércio similar em outras companhias aéreas ocorreu na bolsa de Chicago nos dias imediatamente anteriores à Black Tuesday. A Dean Witter amp, que ocupou 22 andares do World Trade Center, viu 2.157 de suas opções de compra de 45 de outubro, compradas nos três pregões anteriores à terça-feira negra, em comparação a uma média de 27 contratos por dia antes de 6 de setembro. o preço das ações caiu de 48,90 para 42,50 no rescaldo dos ataques. Supondo que 2.000 desses contratos de opções foram comprados com base no conhecimento dos ataques que se aproximavam, seus compradores poderiam ter lucrado pelo menos 1,2 milhão. A Merrill Lynch amp Co, com sede perto das Torres Gêmeas, viu 12.215 opções de venda de 45 de outubro compradas nos quatro pregões anteriores aos ataques. O volume médio anterior nessas ações tinha sido de 252 contratos por dia (um aumento de 1.200). Quando as negociações foram retomadas, as ações da Merrills caíram de 46,88 para 41,50, presumindo que 11.000 contratos de opção foram comprados por quotsiders, e seu lucro teria sido de cerca de 5,5 milhões. Os reguladores europeus estão examinando as transações na Germanys Munich Re, na Suíça suíça e na AXA da França, todas as principais resseguradoras com exposição ao desastre da Black Tuesday. (Nota: A AXA também possui mais de 25 ações da American Airlines, tornando os ataques um "duplo golpe" para eles.) 17 Sobre as declarações do ex-presidente do Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Welteke, seu teor em vários relatórios de imprensa é o seguinte: O presidente do banco central alemão, Ernst Welteke, relata depois que um estudo de seu banco indica: "Há sinais mais claros de que havia atividades nos mercados financeiros internacionais que devem ter sido realizadas com o conhecimento especializado necessário" não apenas em ações de setores altamente afetados. companhias aéreas e seguradoras, mas também em ouro e petróleo. Daily Telegraph, 9/23/2001 Seus pesquisadores encontraram provas irrefutáveis de insider trading. Miami Herald, 24 de setembro de 2001 "Se você olhar para os movimentos nos mercados antes e depois do ataque, isso fará com que o seu testa se enrugue." Mas é extremamente difícil realmente verificá-lo. ”No entanto, ele acredita que, em um ou outro caso, será possível identificar a fonte. Fox News, 22 de setembro de 2001 - Welteke relata cota fundamentalmente inexplicável aumento dos preços do petróleo antes dos ataques Miami Herald, 24/9/2001 e, em seguida, um novo aumento de 13 por cento no dia após os ataques. O ouro sobe sem parar durante dias após os ataques. Daily Telegraph, 23/9/2001 18 Com relação a essas observações, enviei um pedido via e-mail para a assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank em 1 de agosto de 2011, com o qual eu esperava saber: como o Bundesbank lidou com Esta informação fez agências federais dos EUA pedir para ver o estudo Com quem o Bundesbank compartilhar essas informações E além disso: 1. Você pode confirmar que existe tal estudo do Bundesbank sobre 9/11 insider trading, que foi realizado em setembro de 2001 2. Se Sim: qual é o título 3. Se Sim: quem foram os autores 4. Se Sim: o estudo já foi disponibilizado ao público No dia 2 de agosto, fui informado: “Seu e-mail foi recebido por nós e está sendo processado sob o número 2011 / 011551.quot Em última análise, no entanto, a assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank só estava disponível para uma explicação oral no telefone. Com essa explicação, recorri então à assessoria de imprensa do órgão regulador financeiro federal na Alemanha, o Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin, com o seguinte e-mail - e isso por razões óbvias: Ontem, enviei uma solicitação (ver final de (este e-mail) à assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank referente a informações privilegiadas relacionadas aos atentados terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001 e, respectivamente, relativas a um suposto estudo realizado pelo Deutsche Bundesbank. O pedido contém o número de referência 2011 / 011551. A assessoria de imprensa ou, respetivamente, o Sr. Peter Trautmann estava apenas disponível para uma explicação oral. Repito isso agora, porque está relacionado à sua entidade. Isso será seguido por minhas outras perguntas. De acordo com uma explicação oral da assessoria de imprensa do Deutsche Bundesbank, nunca houve um estudo detalhado e oficial sobre o uso de informações privilegiadas do Bundesbank. Pelo contrário, tem havido provavelmente uma análise ad-hoc com gráficos correspondentes de movimentos de preços como briefings para o conselho do Bundesbank. Além disso, teria sido dever do Bundesfinanzaufsicht investigar este assunto. A assessoria de imprensa do Bundesbank também não estava disposta a fornecer qualquer informação por escrito, nem mesmo depois da minha insinuação de que esse suposto estudo do Bundesbank está flutuando na Internet há anos sem qualquer contradição. Essa foi a informação oral do gabinete de imprensa do Bundesbank, ou, respectivamente, do Sr. Peter Trautmann. Agora, minhas perguntas para você: 1. O BaFin já investigou o insider trading do 9/11 2. Com que resultado Os resultados foram divulgados 3. Não houve nenhum motivo para suspeita que justificasse uma investigação, por exemplo, como empresa danificada: Munich Re, e como compradores de opções de venda da UAL United Airlines Company: Deutsche Bank / Alex Brown 4. O Deutsche Bundesbank já perguntou à BaFin quais informações eles têm sobre o insider trading do 9/11 - por exemplo, para a criação de análises ad-hoc para o Bundesbank 5. Já as agências federais dos EUA perguntaram se a BaFin poderia cooperar com eles em uma investigação Você poderia me responder por escrito, ao contrário do Deutsche Bundesbank, por favor eu ficaria muito grato por isso? Na verdade, recebi um e-mail sobre este assunto de Anja Engelland, a assessora de imprensa da BaFin, na qual ela respondeu às minhas perguntas da seguinte forma: 1. Sim, o antigo Bundesaufsichtsamt fur Wertpapierhandel, BAWe (fede supervisão de negociação de valores mobiliários), realizou uma análise abrangente das operações. 2. Como resultado, nenhuma evidência de negociação com base em informações privilegiadas foi encontrada. A sua abordagem e resultados foram publicados pelo BAWe ou pelo BaFin nos relatórios anuais para os anos de 2001 (cf. S 26/27) e 2002 (ver pág. 156, acima, primeiro parágrafo). Aqui estão os links. Veja aqui e aqui. 3. Ver os relatórios anuais de 2001 e 2002. As opções da United Airlines não foram negociadas nas bolsas de valores alemãs (as primeiras opções da EUREX sobre ações dos EUA foram introduzidas somente após os ataques de 11/9/2001) havia mandados sobre a UAL e outros EUA ações, mas aquelas negociadas apenas em baixos volumes. 4. Eu pessoalmente não sei sobre tal pedido. Além disso, o próprio Bundesbank teria que comentar sobre isso. 5. A BaFin tem fundamentalmente o direito de trocar informações com autoridades de supervisão estrangeiras, como a SEC, com base em acordos escritos, os chamados memorandos de entendimento (MoU). No que diz respeito a potenciais investigações de autoridades de supervisão estrangeiras, o BaFin infelizmente não pode comentar, isso seria uma questão da respectiva autoridade. Por isso peço compreensão. Em seguida, escrevi outra breve nota à BaFin, a fim de evitar qualquer mal-entendido: suas respostas referem-se, tanto quanto eu entendo, apenas aos mercados financeiros da Alemanha e Frankfurt, ou não A resposta da BaFin: mercado como um todo e não apenas na Bolsa de Valores de Frankfurt. Em termos de avaliação dos mercados financeiros estrangeiros, as autoridades competentes são os pontos de contato competentes. Em minhas investigações, mencionei, entre outras coisas, um estudo científico do economista americano Allen M Poteshman, da Universidade de Illinois em Urbana-Champaign, que havia sido realizado em 2006 sobre a opção de venda em torno do 11 de setembro companhias aéreas envolvidas, United Airlines e American Airlines. Poteshman chegou a esta conclusão: “O exame da negociação de opções que antecedeu o 11 de setembro revela que houve um nível incomumente alto de compra de put. Este achado é consistente com investidores informados tendo negociado opções antes dos ataques. 19 Outro estudo científico foi conduzido pelos economistas Wong Wing-Keung (Universidade Baptista de Hong Kong, HKBU), Howard E Thompson (Universidade de Wisconsin) e Kweehong Teh ( Universidade Nacional de Cingapura, NUS), cujas descobertas foram publicadas em abril de 2010 sob o título quotWas There Abnormal Trading in the SampP 500 Opções de índice antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro Motivado pelo fato de que houve muitos relatos da mídia sobre possível abuso de informação privilegiada antes para 9/11 nos mercados de opções, os autores analisaram este estudo no Standard amp Poors 500 Index (Opções de Índice SPX), em particular com um foco em estratégias provenientes de um mercado em baixa, nomeadamente sob os rótulos quotPut Purchase, quotPut Bear Spread e quotNaked ITM Call Write, já que cada uma delas está de acordo com a suposição de que alguém estaria apostando em um mercado de ações em geral se quisesse o lucro em antecipação ao evento de 11 de setembro. 20 Nessa linha, os autores referem-se a um artigo que Erin E Arvedlund publicou em 8 de outubro de 2001, em Barrons, cujo título sugeria precisamente essa tese: “Siga o dinheiro: os conspiradores de terror poderiam ter se beneficiado mais com a queda de todo o 21 Basicamente, Wong, Thompson e Teh chegaram à conclusão de que nossas descobertas mostram que houve um aumento anormal significativo no volume de negócios no mercado de opções pouco antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro, em contraste com a ausência do mercado. de volume de negociação anormal muito antes dos ataques. More specifically, they stated, quotOur findings from the out-of-the-money (OTM), at-the-money (ATM) and in-the-money (ITM) SPX index put options and ITM SPX index call options lead us to reject the null hypotheses that there was no abnormal trading in these contracts before September 11th. quot Instead, they found evidence for quotabnormal trading volume in OTM, ATM and ITM SPX index put optionsquot for September 2001, and also in quotITM-SPX index call optionsquot for the same month. quotIn addition, we find that there was evidence of abnormal trading in the September 2001 OTM, ATM and ITM SPX index put options immediately after the 9-11 attacks and before the expiration date. This suggests that owning a put was a valuable investment and those who owned them could sell them for a considerable profit before the expiration date. quot From all of this, they took the position that whilst they couldnt definitively prove that insiders were active in the market, quotour results provide credible circumstantial evidence to support the insider trading claimquot. 22 Disambiguation: quotin the moneyquot means that the circumstances arise on which the owner of a put option is betting - the market price of the underlying asset, for example a stock (or in this case an index of shares), is lower at that moment compared to the price at the time when the transaction took place. quotAt the moneyquot means that the price of the underlying asset has remained equal or nearly equal. And quotout-of-the-moneyquot means that the price of the underlying asset has gone up, so the opposite of what the owner of the put option was betting on took place. quotIn the moneyquot: win. quotOut of the moneyquot: loss. There are also ITM, ATM and OTM options both for trading strategies with put and call options, depending on which kind of risk one would like to take. For example, according to Wong, Thomson and Teh, the quotPut-Purchase Strategyquot in the case of a downward movement of the underlying asset quotis a cheaper alternative to short-selling of the underlying asset and it is the simplest way to profit when the price of the underlying asset is expected to declinequot. The use of the OTM put option compared to the ITM put option, however, offers quotboth higher reward and higher risk potentials (. ) if the underlying asset falls substantially in price. However, should the underlying asset decline only moderately in price, the ITM put often proves to be the better choice (. ) because of the relative price differential. quot That is why speculators would fare best, if they bought ITM put options, quotunless the speculators would expect a very substantial decline in the price of the underlying asset. quot 23 After they calculated such strategies in the light of the available trading data in the CBOE relating to 9/11, the three economists ultimately do not accept a possible counter-argument that their results could be attributed to the fact that the stock markets were generally falling and that there had already been a negative market outlook. Finally they pointed out: quotMore conclusive evidence is needed to prove definitively that insiders were indeed active in the market. Although we have discredited the possibility of abnormal volume due to the declining market, such investigative work would still be a very involved exercise in view of the multitude of other confounding factors, quot such as confusing trading strategies, quotintentionally employed by the insidersquot in order to attract less attention. 24 That would be - and if only to invalidate these scientific results once and for all - primarily a task for the SEC, the FBI and other governmental authorities of the United States. However, we will have to wait for this in vain. I think that not less worthy of a mention is an article that the French financial magazine Les Echos published in September 2007 about a study conducted by two independent economics professors from the University of Zurich, Marc Chesney and Loriano Mancini. Journalist Marina Alcaraz summarized the content of the findings in Les Echos with these words and with these explanations by Professor Chesney, which I for the first time translated into German (and do now translate from French into English): quotThe atypical volumes, which are very rare for specific stocks lead to the suspicion of insider trading. quot Six years after the attacks on the World Trade Center this is the disturbing results of a recent study by Marc Chesney and Loriano Mancini, professors at the University of Zurich. The authors, one of them a specialist in derivative products, the other a specialist in econometrics, worked on the sales options that were used to speculate on the decline in the prices of 20 large American companies, particularly in the aerospace and financial sector. Their analysis refers to the execution of transactions between the 6th and 10th of September 2001 compared to the average volumes, which were collected over a long period (10 years for most of the companies). In addition, the two specialists calculated the probability that different options within the same sector in significant volumes would be traded within a few days. quotWe have tried to see if the movements of specific stocks shortly before the attacks were normal. quot We show that the movements for certain companies such as American Airlines, United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Marsh amp McLehnan are rare from a statistical point of view, especially when compared to the quantities that have been observed for other assets like Coca-Cola or HP, quot explains Marc Chesney, a former Professor at the HEC and co-author of Blanchiment et financement du terrorisme ( Money laundering and financing of terrorism ), published by Editions Ellipses. quotFor example 1,535 put option contracts on American Airlines with a strike of 30 and expiry in October 2001 were traded on September 10th, in contrast to a daily average of around 24 contracts over the previous three weeks. The fact that the market was currently in a bear market is not sufficient to explain these surprising volumes. quot The authors also examined the profitability of the put options and trades for an investor who acquired such a product between the 6th and 10th September. quotFor specific titles, the profits were enormous. quot quotFor example, the investors who acquired put options on Citigroup with an expiry in October 2001 could have made more than 15 million profit, quot he said. On the basis of the connection of data between volumes and profitability, the two authors conclude that quotthe probability that crimes by Insiders (Insider trading) occurred. is very strong in the cases of American Airlines, United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup and JP Morgan. quotThere is no legal evidence, but these are the results of statistical methods, confirming the signs of irregularities. quot 25 As Alcaraz continued to state for Les Echos, the study by Chesney/Mancini about possible insider trading related to the 9/11 attacks was not the first of its kind but it was in sharp contrast to the findings of the US Securities and Exchange Commission SEC and the 9/11 Commission, since they classified the insider trading as negligible - the trades in question had no connection to 9/11 and had quotconsistently proved innocuousquot. Different in the assessment is also the scientific work that Chesney and Mancini had published together with Remo Crameri in April 2010 at the University of Zurich, quotDetecting Informed Trading Activities in the option markets. quot In the segment that is dedicated to the terror attacks of 9/11, the three authors come to the conclusion, that there had been notable insider trading shortly before the terrorist attacks on September 11 that was based on prior knowledge. Without elaborating on the detailed explanation of the mathematical and statistical method, which the scientific trio applied during the examination of the put option transactions on the CBOE for the period between 1996 and 2006, I summarize some of their significant conclusions. quotCompanies like American Airlines, United Airlines, Boeingquot - the latter company is a contractor of the two airlines as aircraft manufacturer - quotand to a lesser extent, Delta Air Lines and KLM seem to have been targets for informed trading activities in the period leading up to the attacks. The number of new put options issued during that period is statistically high and the total gains realized by exercising these options amount to more than 16 million. These findings support the results by Poteshman (2006) who also reports unusual activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks. quot 26 In the banking sector, Chesney, Crameri and Mancini found five informed trading activities in connection to 9/11. quotFor example the number of new put options with underlying stock in Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch issued in the days before the terrorist attacks was at an unusually high level. The realized gains from such trading strategies are around 11 million. quot 27 For both areas, the aviation and the banking sector, the authors state that quotin nearly all cases the hypothesisquot, that the put options were not hedged, quotcannot be rejectedquot. 28 Regarding the options traded on EUREX, one of the worlds largest trading places for derivatives, which in 1998 resulted from the merger between the German and Swiss futures exchanges DTB and SOFFEX, Chesney, Mancini and Crameri focused on two reinsurance companies, which incurred costs in terms of billions of dollars in connection with the World Trade Center catastrophe: Munich Re and Swiss Re. On the basis of EUREX trading data provided by Deutsche Bank, the three scientists detected one informed option trade related to Munich Re, which occurred on August 30, 2001. The authors write: quotThe detected put option with underlying Munich Re matured at the end of September 2001 and had a strike of 320 (the underlying asset was traded at 300, 86 on August 30th). That option shows a large increment in open interest of 996 contracts (at 92.2 quintile of its two-year empirical distribution) on August 30th. Its price on that day was 10, 22. On the day of the terrorist attacks, the underlying stock lost more than 15 (the closing price on September 10th was 261, 88 and on September 11th 220, 53) and the option price jumped to 89, 56, corresponding to a return of 776 in eight trading days. The gains. related to the exercise of the 996 new put options issued on August 30th correspond to more than 3.4 million. quot Similar is true, according to the authors, for one informed option trade on Swiss Re on August 20, 2001 with quota return of 4,050 in three trading weeksquot, or quotmore than 8 million. quot 29 In a new version of their study that was published on September 7, 2011, the authors stuck to their findings from April 2010. They added the emphasis that in no way the profits gained with the put options to which they point could have been achieved due to sheer fortunate coincidence, but that in fact they were based on prior knowledge which had been exploited. 30 With those results in terms of what went on at the EUREX according to Chesney, Crameri and Mancini, I again addressed the BaFin, which had written to me that for the financial centers in Germany insider trading around 9/11 could be excluded, and asked: How does this go with your information that the federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) could in its comprehensive analysis not find evidence for insider trading Do the authors, so to speak, see ghosts with no good reason In addition, I stated: If it is true what Chesney, Crameri and Mancini write, or if you at the BaFin cannot (ad hoc) refute it, would this then cause the BaFin to thoroughly investigate the matter again If the findings of Chesney, Crameri, and Mancini were true, this would constitute illegal transactions relating to a capital crime, which has no status of limitations, or not In case that a need for clarification had arisen at the BaFin, I added Professor Chesney to my e-mail-inquiry in the quotcarbon copyqu ot - address field, as because these were the results of his scientific work. The response that I received from BaFin employee Dominika Kula was as follows: As I already told you in my e-mail, the former federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the operations in 2001. As a result, no evidence of insider trading has been found. For clarification purposes, I wish to point out that violations of statutory provisions of securities or criminal law can never be excluded with absolute certainty. In order to pursue and prosecute such matters concrete evidence of an unlawful act is required. Such evidence does not exist here. With regard to the sources you mentioned, I ask for understanding that I can neither comment on scientific analyses, nor on reviews by third parties. Regarding the statutes of limitations for offences relating to the violation insider trading regulations trading I can give you the following information: A violation of the law to prohibit insider trading is punishable with imprisonment up to 5 years or with fines. The statutes of limitations applied for crimes carrying this kind of penalty (section 78 paragraph 3 No. 4 Penal Code) are five years. These limitations are described in the statutes of limitations ( 78 et seq.) (Criminal Code). In addition, I turned to the EUREX with three questions: 1. How do you as EUREX comment on the findings of Messrs Chesney, Mancini and Crameri 2. Did you at EUREX perceive the particular trading in Munich Re and Swiss Re it in any way as strange 3. Have domestic (eg BAWe and BaFin) or foreign (such as the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission) authorities ever inquired if there may have been evidence of insider trading via the EUREX in connection with the 9/11 attacks I subsequently received the following response from Heiner Seidel, the deputy head of the press office of the Deutsche Borse in Frankfurt. We do not give you a public written response on behalf of the Deutsche Brse or Eurex regarding the topics of your inquiry. This is for the following reason: the trade monitoring agency (HSt) is part of the Exchange, but it is independent and autonomous. Their investigations are confidential and are carried out in close coordination with the BaFin. They are never public, a request which HSt is therefore not meaningful. I leave it to the reader to draw his/her conclusions from these two replies from the press offices of BaFin and Deutsche Borse. Regarding the topic of option trades related to 9/11, I once more talked with Swiss historian Dr Daniele Ganser (quotOperation Gladioquot), by asking him this time about the importance of those put options, which were traded shortly before the attacks of September 11, 2001. Daniele Ganser: This is an important point. This is about demonstrating that there was insider trading on the international stock exchanges before 11 September. Specifically put options, ie speculation on falling stock prices were traded. Among the affected stocks were United Airlines and American Airlines, the two airlines involved in the attacks. A colleague of mine, Marc Chesney, professor at the Institute of banking at the University of Zurich, has examined these put options. You first of all have to check if there may have been international speculation that the aviation industry would be experiencing a weak period and whether accordingly also put options on Singapore Airlines, Lufthansa and Swiss were bought. This was not the case. Very significant put option trades were only transacted for these two airlines involved in the attacks. Secondly, you must examine the ratio of put options to call options and look if they had also been purchased to a similarly significant extent that would constitute speculations on rising stock prices. And that is also not the case. There were only significant put options and only significant transactions for United Airlines and American Airlines. Now you need to look further in order to see who actually bought the put options, because that would be the insider who made millions on September 11. Most people are unaware that money was also earned with the attacks on September 11. The Security and Exchange Commission, SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, however, does not publish the information on who bought the put options, because you can do this anonymously. It is disturbing that this data is not made public. What you have is the 9/11 Commission report, and here it is pointed out. that there has been insider trading, but that this insider trading cannot be traced to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which means that it is highly unlikely that it had been Bin Laden. Question: If this is not pursued any further, what does it mean Daniele Ganser: This means that the investigation of the terrorist attacks was incomplete, and always at the point where there are contradictions to the SURPRISE story, no further investigations are made. It looks very much as if one wants to examine only one story, the investigation is therefore one-sided. But this does not only apply to the put options. 31 Interestingly enough, when Dr Ganser points out in his reply that this important data is not published, it is actually only half of the truth. Why The answer is very simple and odd at the same time: David Callahan, the editor of the US magazine SmartCEO, filed a request to the SEC about the put options which occurred prior to September 11 within the framework of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The SEC informed Callahan in its reply of December 23, 2009 under the number quot09 07659-FOIAquot as follows: This letter is in response to your request seeking access to and copies of the documentary evidence referred to in footnote 130 of Chapter 5 of the September 11 (9/11) Commission Report. We have been advised that the potentially responsive records have been destroyed. 32 Therefore, we will unfortunately never know exactly how the SEC and the 9/11 Commission came to their conclusions regarding the 9/11 put options trading for their final report, because relevant documents were not only held back, but also destroyed - and that in spite of an agreement between the SEC and the National Archive of the United States, in which the SEC has agreed to keep all records for at least 25 years. 33 The 9/11 Commission report wrote this in footnote 130 of Chapter 5, which briefly focuses on the alleged insider trading: Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9 / 11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options - investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price - surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on September 6 and American Airlines on September 10 - highly suspicious trading on its face. Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades. These examples typify the evidence examined by the investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. (Joseph Cella interview (Sept 16, 2003 May 7, 2004 May 10-11, 2004) FBI briefing (Aug 15, 2003) SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to SEC Chair and Commissioners, quotPre-September 11, 2001 Trading Review, quot May 15, 2002 Ken Breen interview (Apr. 23, 2004) Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004). The author Mark H Gaffney commented on this finding of Notice. the commission makes no mention in its footnote of the 36 other companies identified by the SEC in its insider trading probe. What about the pre-9/11 surge in call options for Raytheon, for instance, or the spike in put options for the behemoth Morgan Stanley, which had offices in WTC 2 The 9/11 Commission Report offers not one word of explanation about any of this. The truth, we must conclude, is to be found between the lines in the reports conspicuous avoidance of the lions share of the insider trading issue. Indeed, if the trading was truly quotinnocuousquot, as the report states, then why did the SEC muzzle potential whistleblowers by deputizing everyone involved with its investigation The likely answer is that so many players on Wall Street were involved that the SEC could not risk an open process, for fear of exposing the unthinkable. This would explain why the SEC limited the flow of information to those with a quotneed to knowquot, which, of course, means that very few participants in the SEC investigation had the full picture. It would also explain why the SEC ultimately named no names. All of which hints at the true and frightening extent of criminal activity on Wall Street in the days and hours before 9/11. The SEC was like a surgeon who opens a patient on the operating room table to remove a tumor, only to sew him back up again after finding that the cancer has metastasized through the system. At an early stage of its investigation, perhaps before SEC officials were fully aware of the implications, the SEC did recommend that the FBI investigate two suspicious transactions. We know about this thanks to a 9/11 Commission memorandum declassified in May 2009 which summarizes an August 2003 meeting at which FBI agents briefed the commission on the insider trading issue. The document indicates that the SEC passed the information about the suspicious trading to the FBI on September 21, 2001, just ten days after the 9/11 attacks. Although the names in both cases are censored from the declassified document, thanks to some nice detective work by Kevin Ryan we know whom (in one case) the SEC was referring to. The identity of the suspicious trader is a stunner that should have become prime-time news on every network, world-wide. Kevin Ryan was able to fill in the blanks because, fortunately, the censor left enough details in the document to identify the suspicious party who, as it turns out, was none other than Wirt Walker III, a distant cousin to then-president G W Bush. Several days before 9/11, Walker and his wife Sally purchased 56,000 shares of stock in Stratesec, one of the companies that provided security at the World Trade Center up until the day of the attacks. Notably, Stratesec also provided security at Dulles International Airport, where AA 77 took off on 9/11, and also security for United Airlines, which owned two of the other three allegedly hijacked aircraft. At the time, Walker was a director of Stratesec. Amazingly, Bushs brother Marvin was also on the board. Walkers investment paid off handsomely, gaining 50,000 in value in a matter of a few days. Given the links to the World Trade Center and the Bush family, the SEC lead should have sparked an intensive FBI investigation. Yet, incredibly, in a mind-boggling example of criminal malfeasance, the FBI concluded that because Walker and his wife had quotno ties to terrorism. there was no reason to pursue the investigation. quot The FBI did not conduct a single interview. 34 For this translation, I asked Kevin Ryan via e-mail if he could send me a link for his quotnice detective workquot. Ryan, whos in my humble opinion one of roughly 10 people around the world who have to be taken seriously regarding 9/11, replied: You are referring to my paper quotEvidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11.quot See here . The following two references from the paper are relevant to what you are describing. 2 9/11 Commission memorandum entitled quotFBI Briefing on Tradingquot. prepared by Doug Greenburg, 18 August 2003, 22. The 9/11 Commission memorandum that summarized the FBI investigations refers to the traders involved in the Stratesec purchase. From the references in the document, we can make out that the two people had the same last name and were related. This fits the description of Wirt and Sally Walker, who were known to be stock holders in Stratesec. Additionally, one (Wirt) was a director at the company, a director at a publicly traded company in Oklahoma (Aviation General), and chairman of an investment firm in Washington, DC (Kuwam Corp). Here are two other recent articles on Stratesec and its operators. See here and here . The stock of Stratesec, I should add by myself, increased in value from 0.75 per share on September 11 to 1.49 per share when the market re-opened on September 17. As a firm that provides technology-based security for large commercial and government facilities, Stratesec benefited from the soaring demand of security companies right after 9/11. It is also remarkable what Ryan wrote to me regarding a company on which he did some research, too: Viisage Corp, another high-tech security firm. Kevin Ryan: In late 2005, George Tenet became a director for Viisage, which had been flagged by the SEC for 9/11 trading but never investigated. Viisage was led by Roger LaPenta, formerly of Lockheed. Seven months later, in 2006, FBI director Louis Freeh also joined the Viisage board. One might think that when both the CIA director (on 9/11) and the FBI director (from 1993 to June 2001) joined a company suspected of 9/11 insider trading, we might want to go back and actually investigate the SECs flagging of that company. But, of course, that was not the case. In 2009, quotBandar Bushquot hired Freeh as his personal attorney. Freeh is nowadays the bankruptcy trustee of the alleged market manipulator MF Global. And about his client, the former Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar, I should add that we know for sure that he bankrolled indirectly via his wife two of the alleged would-be 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi. 35 But lets get back to the subject of destruction. On September 11, not only human life, aircraft and buildings were destroyed in New York City, but also data on computers and in archives. For example, several federal agencies occupied space in Building 7 of the World Trade Center, including the Securities and Exchange Commission on floors 11 to 13. Those and other data could have given information about the alleged 9/11 insider trading (though it seems to be very unlikely that no backup existed elsewhere independent of the local computer systems). In fact, some technology companies were commissioned to recover damaged hard disks, which had been recovered from the debris and dust of Ground Zero. One of these companies was the English company group Convar, more precisely: their data rescue center in the German city Pirmasens. Erik Kirschbaum from the news agency Reuters reported in December 2001 that Convar had at that time successfully restored information from 32 computers, supporting quotsuspicions that some of the 911 transactions were illegalquot. The suspicion is that inside information about the attack was used to send financial transaction commands and authorizations in the belief that amid all the chaos the criminals would have, at the very least, a good head start, says Convar director Peter Henschel. quot 36 Convar received the costly orders - according to Kirschbaums report the companies had to pay between 20,000 and 30,000 per rescued computer - in particular from credit card companies, because: quotThere was a sharp rise in credit card transactions moving through some computer systems at the WTC shortly before the planes hit the twin towers. This could be a criminal enterprise - in which case, did they get advance warning Or was it only a coincidence that more than 100 million was rushed through the computers as the disaster unfoldedquot 37 The companies for which Convar was active cooperated with the FBI. If the data were reconstructed they should have been passed on to the FBI, and the FBI, according to its statutory mandate, should have initiated further investigation based on the data to find out who carried out these transactions. Henschel was optimistic at the time that the sources for the transactions would come to light. Richard Wagner, a Convar employee, told Kirschbaum that quotillegal transfers of more than 100 million might have been made immediately before and during the disaster. There is a suspicion that some people had advance knowledge of the approximate time of the plane crashes in order to move out amounts exceeding 100 million, he says. They thought that the records of their transactions could not be traced after the main frames were destroyed. quot 38 Wagners observation that there had been quotillegal financial transactions shortly before and during the WTC disasterquot matches an observation which Ruppert describes in Crossing the Rubicon . Ruppert was contacted by an employee of Deutsche Bank, who survived the WTC disaster by leaving the scene when the second aircraft had hit its target. According to the employee, about five minutes before the attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer system had been taken over by something external that no one in the office recognized and every file was downloaded at lightning speed to an unknown location. The employee, afraid for his life, lost many of his friends on September 11, and he was well aware of the role which the Deutsche Bank subsidiary Alex Brown had played in insider trading. 39 I was curious and wanted more information from Convar regarding their work on the WTC-computer hard drives, but also about the statements made by Peter Henschel and Richard Wagner. Thus, I contacted the agency which represents Convar for press matters, with a written request. But their agency quotars publicandiquot informed me swiftly: Due to time constraints, we can currently offer you neither information nor anyone on the part of our client to talk to regarding this requested topic. I also approached KrollOntrack, a very interesting competitor of Convar in writing. Ontrack Data Recovery, which also has subsidiaries in Germany, was purchased in 2002 by Kroll Inc - quotone of the nations most powerful private investigative and security firms, which has long-standing involvement with executive protection US government officials including the president. This would require close liaison with the Secret Service. quot 40 At the time of the 9/11 attacks, a certain Jerome Hauer was one of the managing directors at Kroll Inc. He had previously established the crisis center for the mayor of New York City as director of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which occupied office space on the 23rd floor of the WTC Building 7. Hauer helped former FBI agent John ONeill to get the post of the head of Security Affairs at the WTC, and spent the night of September 11 with ONeill in New York before the latter lost his life on September 11 in the WTC. Hauer was most likely involved in the planning of quotTripod IIquot, the war game exercise at the port of New York City. 41 Therefore, I found it appealing to uncover some more details of this aspect, or, more accurately to find out if Ontrack or KrollOntrack had received an order in 2001 or after to rescue computer hard drives from the WTC. The answer I received from KrollOntrack said: Kroll Ontrack was not at the site of the data recovery - the devices at the Twin Towers have been completely destroyed or vaporized. The firm Kroll was, however, at that time active in the field of computer-forensic investigations, securing devices in the surrounding buildings. In essence, these two inquiries did not help me at all. If anything, a further question arose: why did KrollOntrack send me a response, where it was really obvious that the content did not match the facts After all, I had written in my inquiry that Convar had received orders to restore damaged computer hard drives from the World Trade Center. I sent a new inquiry, attaching a link for Erik Kirschbaums Reuters article and additional cinematic reports on Convars which showed that some of the WTC disks had not been quotcompletely destroyed or vaporizedquot. I stated to KrollOntrack: quotYour answer does not seem to match the facts, when it comes to completely destroyed or vaporized. Will you still stick to your answerquot KrollOntrack then replied that their previously given assessment constituted quotnot a statement, but an opinionquot. I do not find this assessment worthless, because it is in line with the knowledge of the general public and can easily be refuted in argumentum in contrario by Convars activities. One film report to which I referred to in my second inquiry to KrollOntrack originated from the German television journal Heute-Journal broadcast on March 11, 2002, on ZDF, and the other from the Dutch TV documentary Zembla, broadcast on September 10, 2006. The ZDF report showed that Convar received the WTC disks from the US Department of Defense and that Convar had managed until March 2002 to recover more than 400 hard drives. It also reported that the private companies that employed Convar had paid between 25,000 and 50,000 per hard drive. In the TV documentary Zembla, Convar essentially maintained its position as it had been reported by Erik Kirschbaum in 2001. Obviously, in connection with 9/11 there has not only been insider trading via put options, but there is additional evidence that there have been illegal financial transactions via credit cards through which more than 100 million US dollars were removed from the WTC computer systems. Those occurred shortly before and during the WTC disaster. It remains unclear what the FBI did later on with the data recovered by Convar. On the other hand, it may have been not very much, as can be seen from a memorandum from the 9/11 Commission, which was released in May 2009. The 9/11 Commission asked the FBI about the use of credit cards for insider dealing. On the basis of the information provided by the FBI, the commission came to the conclusion that no such activity occurred because quotthe assembled agents expressed no knowledge of the reported hard-drive recovery effort or the alleged schemequot - but above all quoteverything at the WTC was pulverized to near powder, making it extremely unlikely that any hard-drives survivedquot. 42 The activities of Convar, however, prove the exact opposite. But it gets even better. According to Zembla, the FBI was directly involved with the data rescue efforts of Convar. And on top of it, the broadcast of Heute-Journal reported that Convar worked in that quothighly sensitivequot matter with several federal agencies of the United States government. So there have been ample indications for insider trading based on foreknowledge of the attacks, but there are very few hard facts as Catherine Austin Fitts, a former managing director and member of the board of the Wall Street investment bank Dillon, Read amp Co, Inc (now part of UBS), pointed out when I talked with her about this topic. Ms Fitts, what are your general thoughts related to the alleged 9/11-insider trading Catherine Austin Fitts: Well, Ive never been able to see concrete evidence that the insider trading has been proved. Theres a lot of anecdotal information from investment bankers and people in the investment community that indicate that there was significant insider trading, particularly in the currency and bond markets, but again it hasnt been documented. I think around situations like 9/11 weve seen things that can only be explained as insider trading. Therefore, it wouldnt surprise me if it turns out the allegations are true, because my suspicion is that 9/11 was an extremely profitable covert operation and a lot of the profits came from the trading. It wouldnt even surprise me if it turns out that the Exchange Stabilization Fund traded it and that some of the funding for the compensation fund for the victims came from the ESF. Insider trading happens around these kinds of events, but if you really want to produce evidence of insider trading, you need the subpoena powers of the SEC, and of course we know that they havent exercised them. If anything, right after 9/11, the government settled a significant amount of cases I presume because a lot of the documents were destroyed by the destruction of WTC building number 7, where the SEC offices and other governmental investigation offices were. 43 Fitts, who had written a longer essay in 2004 related to this, replied to my question about who had benefited from 9/11: Catherine Austin Fitts: 9/11 was extraordinarily profitable for Wall Street, they of course got a kind of quotGet Out of Jail Free cardquot as Ive just described. In addition, the largest broker of government bonds, Cantor Fitzgerald, was destroyed, and there was a great deal of money missing from the federal government in the prior four or five years. If you look at the amount of funds involved, it is hard to come to a conclusion other than massive securities fraud was involved, so I find it very interesting that this happened. 44 A short explanation: Cantor Fitzgeralds headquarters were located in the North Tower of the WTC (floors 101-105). On 9/11, the company lost nearly two-thirds of its entire workforce, more than any other tenant in the WTC. (Also two other government bonds brokers, Garbon Inter Capital and Eurobrokers, occupied office space in the WTC towers that were destroyed.) Back to Fitts and the question: quotCui bono 9/11quot Catherine Austin Fitts: In addition, the federal government took the position that they couldnt produce audited financial statements after 9/11, because they said the office at the Pentagon that produced financial statements was destroyed. Now given what I know of the federal set up of financial statements, I am skeptical of that statement. But needless to say, if you take the government on its word, you had another quotGet Out of Jail Free cardquot for four trillion dollars and more missing from the federal government. So if youre just looking at the financial fraud angle, there were a lot of parties that benefited from 9/11. But then of course what 9/11 did, it staged the passage of the Patriot Act and a whole series of laws and regulations that I collectively refer to as quotThe Control on Concentration of Cash Flow Act. quot It gave incredible powers to centralize. In addition, if you look at monetary policies right after 9/11 - I remember I was over in the City of London driving around with a money manager and his phone rang and he answered it on his speaker phone. It was somebody on Wall Street who he hadnt talked to since before 9/11, and he said to him: quotOh Harry, I am so sorry about what has happened, it must have been very traumatic. quot And the guy said: quotDont be ridiculous We were able to borrow cheap short and invest long, were running a huge arbitrage, were making a fortune, this is the most profitable thing that ever happened to usquot - So you could tell the monetary policies and sort of insider games were just pumping profits into the bank at that time, so that was very profitable. But of course the big money was used for a significant movement of the military abroad and into Afghanistan and then into Iraq. You could see that the country was being prepared to go to war. And sure enough, 9/11 was used as a justification to go to war in Afghanistan, to go to war in Iraq, and commit a huge number of actions, and now much of the challenges about the budget are the result of extraordinary expenditures on war including in Afghanistan and Iraq and the costs of moving the army abroad and engaging in this kind of empire building with ground military force. So I think if you ask Cui Bono on 9/11, one of the big categories was all the people who made money on engineering the popular fear they needed to engineer these wars. I believe whether it was financial fraud, engineering new laws or engineering wars, it was a fantastically profitable covert operation. 45 In that category of people who benefit from 9/11 are also the arms manufacturer Raytheon, whose share price gained directly from the 9/11 attacks. Trading of the shares of Raytheon, the producer of Tomahawk and Patriot missiles (and parent company of E-systems, whose clients include the National Security Agency and CIA), experienced an abrupt six-time increase of call option purchases on the day immediately before September 11. 46 The outright purchase of call options implies the expectation that a stock price will rise. In the first week after 9/11, when the New York Stock Exchange opened again, the value of Raytheon actually shot up considerably. Looking at the development of the stock price, the impression is a very weak performance before the attacks - and then, after resumption of trade, a quotgapquot (at substantial volume) upwards. In other words: just under 25 on September 10, the low in the period between August 20 to September 28, at 31, 50 on September 17 and up to 34, and 80 on September 27, 2001. With regards to government bonds, buyers of US Treasury securities with a maturity of five years were also winners. These securities were traded in an unusually large volume shortly before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal reported at least in early October 2001 that the Secret Service had started an investigation into a suspiciously high volume of US government bond purchases before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal explained: Five-year Treasury bills are the best investments in the event of a global crisis, in particular one like this which has hit the United States. The papers are treasured because of their safety, and because they are covered by the US government, and usually their prices rise if investors shun riskier investments, such as shares. 47 Adding to this phenomenon, the government issues these bonds that serve as a basis of money creation for funding a war such as the immediately declared quotwar on terrorquot, engaging the Tomahawks from Raytheon. And here it may again be useful to have a quick look at the quotcui bonoquot relationship: The US Federal Reserve creates money to fund the war and lends it to the American government. The American government in turn must pay interest on the money they borrow from the Central Bank to fund the war. The greater the war appropriations, the greater the profits are for bankers. 48 A multi-layered combination, one could say. I also talked about the topic of 9/11 insider trading with one of the worlds leading practitioners at the interface between the international capital markets, the national security policy of the US as well as geopolitics, James G Rickards. He gave me some answers in a personal discussion, which I am allowed to repeat here with his expressed approval. Question: Did suspicious trading activities of uncovered put options on futures markets occur shortly before 9/11 James G Rickards: Well, the trading documents certainly look suspicious. It is simply a fact that an unusually high volume of purchases of put-options for the two airlines occurred over the three trading days before the attacks. This is a mere fact, no speculation, no guessing around. This is clearly obvious from the documents of the trading sessions on the derivatives exchanges. Question: Do you think that the intelligence agencies could have got a warning signal based on this information James G Rickards: Theoretically that is possible, if are you are looking and watching out for this. But there was far more significant information, which was ignored. Question: Do you also think that some people with foreknowledge operated speculatively in the option markets James G Rickards: Based on the documentation of the trading session it seems that this has been the case, yes. Lets sum up a bit at the end. We have, among other things: The quotnice detective workquot by Kevin Ryan related to Stratesec/Wirt Walker III. Some highly inconsistent information vis-a-vis Convar/illegal credit card transactions. Scientific papers supporting the allegations that there were indeed unusual trading activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, although the 9/11 Commission (based on the investigation of the SEC and the FBI) ruled that possibility out. As it became clear that I would publish this article here at Asia Times Online, I contacted the US Federal Bureau of Investigation via its press spokesman Paul Bresson in order quotto give the FBI the opportunity to give a public statement with regards to three specific issuesquot. Those three specific issues were the ones I have just highlighted. Related to each of them Ive asked Mr Bresson/the FBI: quotCould you comment on this for the public, pleasequot Up to this moment, Mr Bresson/the FBI did not respond to my inquiry in any way whatsoever. Does this come as a surprise Ive also got back in touch with quotars publicandiquot, the firm that does public relations for Convar in Germany. The response said: quotUnfortunately I have to inform you that the status has not changed, and that Convar considers the issue of 9/11 as dead in general. quot As you have read, the status in August of last year was slightly different. At the end of this article, I should perhaps mention that this research ultimately led to negative consequences for me. After I contacted the FBI, I was informed by the publisher of a German financial website, for which I conducted interviews for a professional fee (and had already prepared more work), that no further cooperation was possible. Now that I will come in one way or another into the focus of the FBI, any association with me would be undesirable. Well, you know the rules. As far as the abnormal option trades around 9/11 are concerned, I want to give Max Keiser the last word in order to point out the significance of the story. Max Keiser: Regardless of who did it, we can know that more than a few had advance warning - the trading in the option market makes that clear. Notes i. PROMIS was first developed by Inslaw during the 1970s under contracts and grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). These guarantees gave the government licenses to use the early versions of PROMIS but not to modify them, or to create derivative works, or to distribute PROMIS outside the federal government. By 1982, because of strong disagreements over a fee-incentive, Modification 12 Agreement to the original contract, the United States Department of Justice and Inslaw Inc became involved in a widely-publicized and protracted lawsuit. PROMIS was originally designed as a case-management system for prosecutors. (Source Wikipedia.) 1. Compare Michael C Ruppert: Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age Of Oil . New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, 2004, page 152. 2. Ibid, page 153. 3. Ibid, page 154-155. 4. Ibid, page 170. 5. Ibid, page 238-253: quot9/11 Insider Trading, or You Didnt Really See That, Even Though We Saw It. quot 6. Ibid, page 239. 7. Compare Chris Blackhurst: quotMystery of terror insider dealers quot, published at The Independent on October 4, 2001, see here. 8. Compare quotProfits of Deathquot, published at From the Wilderness on December 6, 2001, see here. 9. For the fact, that it was George Tenet who recruited Krongard, compare George Tenet: At the Center of the Storm . Harper Collins, New York, 2007, page 19. 10. Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: quotDetecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Marketsquot, University of Zurich, April 2010, online here. 11. Nafeez M Ahmed: Geheimsache 09/11. Hintergrnde uber den 11. September und die Logik amerikanischer Machtpolitik . Goldmann Verlag, Munich, 2004, page 182. (Translated back into English from German.) 12. Compare Michael C Ruppert: Crossing the Rubicon . page 244-247. 13. Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson und Kweehong Teh: quotWas there Abnormal Trading in the SampP 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacksquot, published at Social Sciences Research Network, April 2010, see here. 14. Compare quotBank of America among 38 stocks in SECs attack probequot, published at Bloomberg News on October 3, 2001, archived here. 15. Michael C Ruppert: Crossing the Rubicon . page 243. 16. Ibid. 17. quotSuppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIAs Highest Ranksquot, published at From the Wilderness on October 9, 2001, see here. 18. Compare quotEarly September 2001: Almost Irrefutable Proof of Insider Trading in Germanyquot, published at History Commons, see here. 19. Allen M Poteshman: quotUnusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001quot, published in The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, 2006, Vol 79, Edition 4, page 1703-1726. 20. Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E Thompson und Kweehong Teh: quotWas there Abnormal Trading in the SampP 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacksquot, see end note 13. 21. Ibid. The authors refer to Erin E Arvedlund: quotFollow the money: terrorist conspirators could have profited more from fall of entire market than single stocksquot, published in Barrons on October 8, 2001. 22. Wong, Thompson, Teh: quotWas there Abnormal Trading in the SampP 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacksquot 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Marina Alcaraz: quot11 septembre 2001: des volumes inhabituels sur les options peu avant lattentatquot, published in Les Echos, page 34, September 10, 2001, online here. 26. Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: quotDetecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Marketsquot, see end note 10. 27. Ibid. 28. ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: quotDetecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Marketsquot, published at the University of Zurich on September 7, 2011, see here. 31. Vgl Lars Schall: quotSapere Audequot, German Interview with Dr Daniele Ganser, published at LarsSchall on August 18, 2011, see here. 32. Compare a copy of the letter by the SEC on MaxKeiser, see here. 33. Compare related to this agreement Matt Taibbi: quotIs the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimesquot, published at Rolling Stone on August 17, 2011, see here . 34. Mark H Gaffney: quotBlack 9/11: A Walk on the Dark Sidequot, published at Foreign Policy Journal on March 2, 2011, see here. 35. Compare Peter Dale Scott: quotLaunching the US Terror War: the CIA, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Central Asiaquot, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 12, No 3, March 19, 2012, see online here. 35. Erik Kirschbaum: quotGerman Firm Probes Last-Minute World Trade Center Transactionsquot, published at Reuters on December 19, 2001, online here. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Michael C Ruppert: Crossing the Rubicon . page 244. 39. Ibid, page 423. 40. Ibid, page 423-426. 41. Commission Memorandum: quotFBI Briefing on Tradingquot, dated August 18, 2003, page 12, online here. 42. Lars Schall: quot9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operationquot, Interview with Catherine Austin Fitts, published at LarsSchall on September 3, 2011, see here . 43. Ibid. Compare further related to the quotcui bonequot topic Catherine Austin Fitts: quot9-11 Profiteering: A Framework for Building the Cui Bonoquot, published at GlobalResearch on March 22, 2004, see here . 44. Lars Schall: quot9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operationquot, see end note 42. 45. Compare quotBank of America among 38 stocks in SECs attack probequot, see end note 14. quotA Raytheon option that makes money if shares are more than 25 each had 232 options contracts traded on the day before the attacks, almost six times the total number of trades that had occurred before that day. A contract represents options on 100 shares. Raytheon shares soared almost 37 percent to 34.04 during the first week of post-attack US trading. quot 46. Compare Barry Grey: quotSuspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks, quot published at World Socialist Web Site on October 5, 2001, see here. 47. J S Kim: quotInside the Illusory Empire of the Banking Commodity Con Game, quot published at The Underground Investor on October 19, 2010, see here. Lars Schall is a German financial journalist. This article is an exclusive, slightly modified and updated excerpt from the book Mordanschlag 9/11. Eine kriminalistische Recherche zu Finanzen, Ol und Drogen (Assassination 9/11: A criminalistic research on finance, oil and drugs), published in Germany by Schild Verlag. Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. Scroll down to add your comments - Please read our Comment Policy before posting -
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